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ABSTRACT 
There are many areas in which naval vessels could improve 
safety standards, although naval vessels are not necessarily 
regarded as less secure than the civil vessels.  Although the 
navies never have considered water on deck a problem, it 
seems that this problem has a critical value in the ship damage 
stability analysis.  As an example, this damage should be in-
vestigated if the ship has a low freeboard. 
For this research various studies and calculations have been 
carried out on several designed test vessels.  It is possible to 
decide which criteria to use in terms of damages for each type 
of vessel, for example a landing ship faces more risk having 
grounding or raking on its bottom.  This technical paper con-
cludes with a method that helps and supports the naval archi-
tect in the analysis of damage stability.  In this way, the naval 
engineer is able to determine which of the existing criteria fits 
best with the requirements of the ships function by following 
these few principles. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
To avoid duplication, gaps and shortcomings in safety, it is 
important for the navies to work together with the Classifica-
tion Societies in the development of effective and sustainable 
arrangements.  Thus, development of rules for warships Naval 
Ships Rules by various Classification Societies is the most 
important contribution to work in this area.  The idea of coop-
eration to make an International Convention for the Safety Of 
Life At Sea (SOLAS) goes back to the nineties of the last 
century.  Remember that the philosophy of the SOLAS is 
applicable to merchant ships, and is not fully transferable to 
warships.  In September 1998, Classification Societies of the 
Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) met to establish links within their own organization. 
This meeting established the Naval Ship Classification Asso-
ciation (NSCA), in May 2002, and the cooperation was de-
fined according to the following terms of reference: promote 
safety standards at sea, promote measures to protect the ma-
rine environment, promote and develop common operating 
standards, undertake R&D to support the above and commu-
nicate the views of the partnership agreements and the NSCA. 
II. A BIG DEBATE: DETERMINISTIC OR
PROBABILISTIC CRITERIA 
At this moment, the community of Naval Architects is de-
bating between the probabilistic and the deterministic methods. 
It is therefore necessary to define in this technical paper what 
a deterministic or a probabilistic method is.  To verify the 
validity of a model it is necessary to deduct from it a certain 
number of hypothesis and then to corroborate it with obser-
vations of predicted results. 
Deterministic models correspond to mathematical models 
designed on the assumption that the result of an experiment is 
determined by the conditions under which it is performed; 
stochastic models (probabilistic) are those for which the data 
is obtained through a sampling of probability distributions. 
This sample allows that uncertainty (which can be reduced if 
more data is collected) and variability are propagated from the 
model and demonstrated in the results of the model. 
Are probabilistic and deterministic approaches compara-
ble? 
 From a mathematical point of view: in general no.
 From a theoretical point of view: limited way.
 From a practical point of view (analysis of real ships…):
yes.
In Table 1 and Table 2 it is possible to visualize the prob-
abilistic and deterministic approaches, plus the damage crite-
ria applicability. 
Are different probabilistic approaches comparable? 
 From a mathematical point of view: yes.
 From a theoretical point of view: yes.
 From a practical point of view (analysis of real ships…):
yes.
Not all the civil ships must follow the probabilistic criteria.  
There are several groups of ships that do not follow the new 
criteria and still using deterministic criteria: 
Table 1.  Probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches. 
Approach Probabilistic Deterministic
Damage Size Variable Fixed 
Number of damaged spaces No pre determinate Fixed 
Damage Cases Several/Free Few/Fixed 
Table 2.  Damage criteria applicability. 
Ships Carriers Passenger
Before 2009 Probabilistic  (Old SOLAS) 
Deterministic (SOLAS 90)
Probabilistic (A.265) 
After 2009 Probabilistic (new rules) Probabilistic (new rules)
Size L  80 (m) All 
 Tankers, chemical ships.
 Ships with a reduced freeboard.
 Special craft and offshore ships.
 High speed crafts.
In summary, it could be said that a deterministic model 
assumes that the actual result is determined by the conditions 
under which the experiment takes place, however when a sto-
chastic model is used, the experimental conditions determine 
only probabilistic behavior (the probability distribution) of 
the observable results.  The criteria of US Navy and British 
Royal Navy are based on deterministic models, so it is nec-
essary to remember the importance of these models.  Given the 
relevancy of probabilistic methods, they have been evaluated; 
in particular we have studied the philosophy and new tools for 
its calculation. 
It is equally important to point out the pros and cons of 
using probabilistic criteria.  These probabilistic criteria are 
aiming to provide estimates of uncertainty and variability 
associated with each of the predicted levels of risk.  This is 
one of the positive aspects (stochastic) of such configuration 
models, but also leads to confusion in the interpretation of the 
data.  Furthermore, those same estimations are uncertain and 
depend on the methods and assumptions used to make these 
calculations.  This fact is frequently overvalued due to the 
limited data set available, and perhaps overestimating risk 
associated with a particular fault. 
An assessment procedure would be considered a more ef-
fective method for implementing the proposal of survival of an 
optimized schema of design of vessels.  The assessment pro-
cedure is an approach that bases the probability of survival on 
the basis of survival in quasi static criteria such as that of the 
US Navy and British Royal Navy.  Philosophy for the trans-
formation of these deterministic in a set of rational criteria 
with a stochastic approach or probabilistic criteria is based on 
the Resolution A.265 (VIII) of the Design Data Sheet (DDS) 
for passenger ships.  Passenger ships, longer than the military 
ships, still rely on deterministic criteria. 
From the first of February of 1992 the probabilistic method 
was inserted into SOLAS as Part B-1 of the Chapter II-1, 
Table 3.  Use cases about required subdivision index. 
Case Carriers (new vs. old rules) 
Passenger 
(new rules vs. A.265) 
Length > in new ones > in new ones except very high L 
Number of people N/A > in new ones except very high N 
annex Regulation for subdivision and damage stability of 
cargo ship over one hundred meters in length, that applies to 
dry cargo ships constructed on or after the first of February of 
1992.  Later on, ships with length between eighty and one 
hundred meters were also included. 
The 8th Assembly of International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), in the Resolution A.265 (VIII), adopted a set of prob-
abilistic regulations of subdivisions, which increased the re-
quirements for damage stability passenger ships according to 
the Part B of Chapter II of the SOLAS 1960 for passenger 
ships. 
Finally in the 80th session of IMO, Maritime Safety Com-
mittee (MSC) the working group finalized a substantial revi-
sion of SOLAS CHII pt 1 A, B and B1 aiming at harmonized 
damage stability requirements for all ship types except tankers, 
performed by means of a common probabilistic methods.  The 
draft was adopted at the MSC 80 without further modification. 
The revised Ch II-1 will apply to all new passengers vessel, 
ro-ro (roll on-roll off) and cargo ships built on or after the first 
of January of 2009 (Pérez and Riola, 2011a). 
Probabilistic concepts address the probability of damage 
occurring at any location throughout a ship and adopt a more 
rational criterion of subdivision by considering the likelihood 
of damage resulting in the flooding of only one compartment, 
or any number of adjacent compartments, either longitudi- 
nally, transversely or vertically.  The residual buoyancy and 
stability of a ship is calculated for each such case of damage, 
and either a positive or a zero contribution is associated to 
each case, depending on, whether or not, the residual buoy-
ancy and stability are considered sufficient. 
In probabilistic terms, a ship does not need to survive in 
every possible case of damage.  The probabilistic criterion 
provides that there are a number of survival cases which allow 
obtaining a total value A (Attained Subdivision Index) equal 
or greater than a reference R (Required Subdivision Index).  In 
the new SOLAS revision, in addition, the partial index As, Ap 
and Al are not less than 0.9•R for passenger ships and 0.5•R  
for cargo ships.  For an easy understanding about the impli-
cation of the new R index, please see Table 3. 
The A index attained by a ship considered to be measure its 
level of safety against both sinking and capsizing.  In this way, 
two ships that have different main dimensions but whose A 
indexes are equal, may be considered as having the same level 
of safety.  Three loading conditions need consideration: 
0.4 0.4 0.2s p lA A A A     (1)
where the index s, p and l represents the three loading condi-
tions, and the factor that multiplies to the index indicates the 
degree of the index A according with each loading condition. 
It is worth mentioning the debate between deterministic or 
probabilistic methods continues.  In addition it must be em-
phasized that no Navy used stochastic methods or probabil-
istic as exhibited during the development of Naval Ship Code 
(NSC) when the President of the International Association of 
Classification Societies said that it would thus remain.  There-
fore, since the focus of this paper was on warships, mainly due 
to the appearance on the scene of the new NSC which will be 
mandatory for all military naval constructions this year and 
leveraging the use of a Computer Aided Design (CAD) system, 
the objective was the comparison of the various deterministic 
criteria and whether the new NSC was really more or less 
restrictive than the previous version and in which cases (Pérez 
and Riola, 2011b). 
Some of the factors that can improve the probabilistic crite-
ria: 
 Combination of water on deck with the probabilistic con-
cept.
 To optimize compartment and ship design from the point of
its damage stability.  KG (permissible height of the center of
gravity) calculation using a data base of real cases.
 Analysis by ship type.
III. NAVY CRITERIA
1. US Navy Criteria
The criteria used to evaluate adequate damage stability
performance according the Design Data Sheet (DDS) is based 
on a reduction of the righting arm equal to 0.05•cos, and it 
is included in the righting arm curve to account for unknown 
unsymmetrical flooding or transverse shift of loose material. 
Beam wind heeling arm curve is calculated with the same 
method as used for intact stability calculations, but consider-
ing a beam wind velocity of around 33 (knots) as defined in 
DDS.  The damage stability is considered satisfactory if the 
static equilibrium angle of heel c, point C without wind roll-
ing effects does not exceed 15.  The limit angle 1 of the 
damage righting arm curve is 45 or the angle at which unre-
stricted flooding into the ship would occur, whichever is less 
(Sarchin and Goldberg, 1962) and (Surko, 1994). 
In Table 4 there is a comparison between the most impor-
tant naval damage criteria, UK Naval criteria (called NES 109) 
and US Naval criteria (named DDS-079). 
The criterion is considered fulfilled if the reserve of dy-
namic stability A1 is not less than 1.4•A2, where A2 extends r 
to windward.  The tendency during recent decades in surface 
naval ship design was to assess and minimize susceptibility 
through detailed signature management.  For the naval archi-
tect it is usually enough to assess the adequacy of its design 
with respect to vulnerability through the use of the damaged 
Table 4.  UK vs. US Navy damage stability criteria. 
Criteria NES 109 DDS-079
LWL < 30 m 1 compartment 
30 m < LWL < 92 m 2 comp of 6 m Damage length 
92 m < LWL 15% LWL 
Watertight Void 95% 
Accommodation 95%
Machinery 85%-95%
Permeability 
Stores 60%-95%
Area A1 > 1.4 Area A2 
stability requirements introduced by the various navies, such 
as those used by the US Navy and the UK Ministry of Defense 
(MoD). 
A damage incident for the purposes of this chapter is de-
fined as a breach of watertight or watertight integrity.  When 
the watertight or watertight integrity of a ship is breached by 
any mechanism the ship is at risk of loss due to flooding.  The 
extent of the breach and the ship’s initial loading condition and 
material state will dictate the likelihood of the ship being lost. 
Irrespective of whether the damage is caused by an accidental 
or hostile event all damage can be categorized.  The level of 
safety and performance following damage will depend on the 
severity of the damage incident. 
2. Naval Ship Code
In addition to navies, Classification Societies through the
NSCA have a standing invitation to attend the meetings of the 
specialist team as active participants.  The specialist team is 
tasked with the development of a NSC that will provide a cost- 
effective framework for a naval surface ship safety manage-
ment system based on and benchmarked against IMO con-
ventions and resolutions.  The Specialist Team has established 
a Goal Based Approach to the development of the NSC and is 
now developing each chapter in turn.  This folder in the NAS 
(Naval Authority System) library contains the latest docu-
ments including NSC chapters, related guidance and records 
of meetings.  The NSC adopts a goal based approach.  The 
basic principle of a goal based approach is that the goals 
should represent the top tiers of the framework, against which 
ship is verified both at design and construction stages, and 
during ship operation.  This enables the NSC to become pre-
scriptive if appropriate for the subject, or remain at a high level 
with reference to other standards and their assurance processes. 
The goal based approach also permits innovation by allowing 
alternative arrangements to be justified as complying with the 
higher level requirements.  The increasing width of the trian-
gle as the NSC descends through the tiers implies an increas-
ing level of detail (Riola and Pérez, 2009). 
A catastrophic event, Fig. 1, caused by damage that the ship 
and persons on board would not be expected to survive, will 
result in rapid loss of the ship.  Following an extreme event, 
resulting from damage more severe than foreseeable but not 
Stability & buoyancy adequate
Stability & buoyancy marginal
Loss of stability & buoyancy
Catastrophic
Extreme flood
Foreseeable
Guidance: “Take remedial action”
Guidance: “Take immediate remedial action
& consider evacuation”
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Source: Guide to the Naval Ship Code. 
Fig. 1.  Severity of damage event for stability. 
catastrophic, the ship would be expected to remain afloat in a 
condition that will allow personnel to evacuate if required.  In 
the event of damage below the extreme level, foreseeable 
damage, the ship would be expected to survive although the 
level of real operational capability will depend on a particular 
navy’s concept of operations.  Chapter III is primarily concerned 
with foreseeable operating conditions up to extreme damage, 
with exception of the Regulation 6 preservation of life. 
IV. WARSHIP CASE STUDY
1. Application
Nowadays, in both practical navigation and shipyard tech-
nical offices, stability tests in load and sea conditions, as in 
working or damaged conditions, are performed with software 
packages that starting from the ship design are able to quickly 
compute the required data.  This research focuses on evaluat-
ing the configuration of ships.  The CAD used allows visu-
alization of the detailed requirements generated from the sta-
bility requirement chosen, and also enables data entry to 
compute minimum GM’s.  Inside the modules, it is possible to 
check the most common standard stability criteria and a user 
can define criteria, obtaining if necessary, the limiting KG 
values. 
The two chosen ships, called first and second project, for 
this analysis have a double bottom with a height upper to a 
tenth of the beam.  First project is similar to a warship and 
second project is similar to a merchant ship. 
Different configurations, as shown in the Fig. 2, have been 
applied to both of them.  To find the dimensions, a database 
with merchants and warships of similar characteristics has 
been used. 
2. Results
Safety at sea has improved considerably in recent decades
thanks to the incorporation of new technologies to the ships 
Fig. 2.  Solutions for the communication between tanks. 
and the legislative effort made by the IMO, without forgetting 
the work of ship inspections and Classification Societies en-
suring that vessels are constructed and operated according to 
existing regulations.  The major maritime disasters have tra-
ditionally been coupled with the pressure of public opinion, 
alarmed at the loss of life at sea.  It has prompted the gov-
ernments of the major maritime nations in a legislative effort 
to improve the safety of ships.  This is the first case of SOLAS, 
held in London in 1914, two years after the sinking of the 
RMS Titanic, though it was not actually due to the outbreak of 
the World War I.  It is not necessary to go back to early last 
century to find new examples, the collapse and subsequent 
overturning of the MV Estonia in 1994, in waters of the Baltic 
Sea, was the driver, as discussed in chapter two of this article 
of the Stockholm Agreement and a series of resolutions IMO 
related to the stability of such vessels. 
The IMO, as a United Nations agency, was founded in 
Geneva in 1948, but did not start its activity until 1952, to 
develop and maintain the regulatory framework for governing 
the shipping, including aspects such as security or pollution, 
taking into account the international conventions as SOLAS 
or MARPOL, among others.  It is organized into specialized 
committees and subcommittees, consisting of experts from 
member countries to study various aspects of maritime safety 
and the updating of regulatory legislation.  This is the case of 
the MSC, which means all aspects that directly affect the sea, 
such as construction and equipment or the training of crews. 
In the naval field, there are no organizations equivalent to 
the IMO to understand the international level of the safety of 
such vessels.  Traditionally, the warships are taking the existing 
rules of IMO that do not interfere with naval objectives and 
adapting them as far as possible.  The intact stability calcula-
tions are made for checking if the warship complies with the 
intact stability criteria and that if not fulfilled, the values were 
obtained at the end of the study would be worthless. 
Back to the study, depending on ship compartment and 
flood conditions will get damage stability results.  In Fig. 3 
there is one of the damage conditions applied in the first test 
ship.  The flood damage can be considered by an opening in 
the side, at the bottom or the failure of the deck to allow the 
entry of water and lead to flooding of the ship.  In this paper, 
the damage occurs on one side, bottom up.  The ships have 
been damaged, compartment by compartment.  When one 
compartment is flooded, there is a loss of buoyancy, a change 
Table 5.  Intact stability criteria. 
CRITERIA 
NUMBER DESCRIPTION 
1 GZ of 0.2 (m) between 30 and 90 
2 DN of 55.0 (mm•rd) between 0 and 30 
3 DN of 90.0 (mm•rd) between 0 and 40 
4 DN of 30.0 (mm•rd) between 30 and 40 
5 GM > 0.150 (m) 
6 Angle for which a maximum GZ is obtained > 25
7 IMO weather criterion 
Fig. 3.  Longitudinal section/first flood for first project. 
of trim, a variation of a transverse metacentric height and 
longitudinal metacentric height variation.  Now the intention 
is to study the GM’s minimum, or KG’s maximum for the 
three criteria that we want to compare.  To explore the stability 
problems, it needs the help of software to carry out the cal-
culations.  In the case of this research to study the SOLAS, the 
US Navy and the British Royal Navy criteria, the calculations 
were made using a CAD, choosing a damage condition and a 
load condition of the vessel intact, and are getting results that 
are developed below.  The worst damage is one where KG’s 
maximum is the minimum among all possible failures, or put 
another way, which has the stronger GM’s minimum for each 
draft. 
Where DN means dynamic stability and it is measured in 
(mm•rd) and GZ is the righting arm in (m). 
In order to realize a complete study, it is necessary to study 
the intact stability.  Some of the results are shown in Table 5, 
Table 6 and Table 7.  In these tables DP is displacement in tons, 
GM is minimum permissible metacentric height in meters and 
KG is permissible height of the center of gravity in meters. 
3. IMO Applicability
SOLAS implies safety, but is by no means applicable to all
types of vessel.  Mainly because many of its rules are un-
workable or unrealistic for the warships. 
Due to the need to unify criteria for the countries of the 
NATO and the lack of a security policy that ensures minimal 
compliance, a group of specialists was formed with the task of 
Table 6.  Intact stability limit values for first project. 
Draft (m) DP (T) Criteria GZ (m) GM (m) 
3.65 4069.5 7 12.43 3.64 
4.43 4801.9 7 13.03 2.23 
5.37 6364.5 7 13.30 1.19 
6.21 7488.1 7 13.40 0.68 
Table 7.  Intact stability limit values for second project. 
Draft (m) DP (T) Criteria GZ (m) GM (m) 
9.03 42511.5 7 11.352 2.518 
10.75 50138.3 7 12.104 1.576 
12.50 66453.2 7 12.442 0.854 
14.22 78184.4 7 12.623 0.339 
developing the NSC, a naval military code based on national 
standards, international standards such as High Speed Craft, 
high-speed vessels, and primarily, the applicable rules of the 
SOLAS, to promote improvements in the design construction 
and in specific areas such as navigation in international waters, 
communications or environmental protection.  SOLAS begins 
by defining criteria on the extent of damage to consider.  These 
dimensions, based on statistics of failure, are defined as a fault 
length equal to 3% of the length plus three meters, a penetra-
tion of damage equal to B/5 and a height of damage that goes 
from bottom to top without limit.  The worst damage in SOLAS, 
considering water on deck, is composed of two compartments, 
as it is shown in Tables 8 and 9. 
There are certainly some obvious weaknesses in the re-
quirements of the Agreement and this must be borne in mind 
when assessing ro-ro safety.  The Stockholm Agreement was 
created on the presumption that a vessel designed, or modified, 
to SOLAS’90 standards ensures survival at sea states with Hs 
of only 1.5 (m).  This was suggested in the face of uncertainty 
and lack of understanding of the phenomena involved.  The 
evidence amassed so far and presented in the following sug-
gests that this was a considerable underestimate.  The maxi-
mum penalty of 0.5 (m) height of water on deck is ill based.  It 
is to be noted that the forty-nine tests used to measure water 
accumulation on the car deck comprised only four open 
decked ships, the others having car decks with: three trans-
verse bulkheads, five central casing, nineteen central casing 
with transverse bulkheads, eight side casings and ten side 
casings with transverse bulkheads.  It is straightforward to 
prove that the height of water accumulated on a subdivided 
deck is considerably larger than the height of water accumu-
lated on open decks. 
More importantly, requirements based on subdivided decks 
are likely to promote designs with similar arrangements, 
which is contrary to the ro-ro concept itself.  Finally, the effect 
of water on deck is taken into account by a calculation method 
that does not preserve the physics of the problem, and being 
based on static and deterministic approaches, it tends to negate 
Table 8.  Worst damage along with IMO for first project. 
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION 
Draft (m) Displacement (T) KGMAX (m) GMMIN (m)
3.65 4069.5 14.761 1.301
4.43 4801.9 13.959 1.048
5.37 6364.5 13.335 0.889
6.21 7488.1 12.996 0.791
Table 9.  Worst damage along with IMO for second project. 
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION 
Draft (m) Displacement (T) KGMAX (m) GMMIN (m)
  9.03 42511.5 13.345 2.435 
10.75 50138.3 12.776 2.002 
12.50 66453.2 12.322 1.567 
14.22 78184.4 11.986 1.231 
Fig. 4.  USS Nevada trapped in Pearl Harbor. 
the potential for adopting rational approaches to safety through 
the introduction of operational sea states and performance- 
based standards. 
4. US Navy Applicability
The US Navy stability criteria are documented in the DDS,
which is divided into criteria for damage stability for both 
sides´ protected and non-protected vessels.  The non-protected 
criteria relate to the 82.3 (m) cutter that is the class used in this 
investigation.  The DDS states that an angle of less than fifteen 
degrees is required after damage for operational requirements. 
There is no mention of cross-flood systems except for in the 
side-protected vessels, which states that the maximum list 
shall not exceed twenty degrees and that arrangements exist 
for rapidly reducing the list to less than five degrees (US Navy, 
1975).  The current stability criteria used by the US Navy were 
developed during and shortly after World War II.  See the USS 
Nevada in the Fig. 4. 
These criteria are based on static righting arm curve, are 
largely empirical, and do not explicitly consider many vari- 
Table 10.  Worst damage along with DDS for first project. 
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION 
Draft (m) Displacement (T) KGMAX (m) GMMIN (m)
3.65 4069.5 15.147 0.919
4.43 4801.9 14.232 0.787
5.37 6364.5 13.641 0.673
6.21 7488.1 13.412 0.620
Table 11.  Worst damage along with DDS for second project. 
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION 
Draft (m) Displacement (T) KGMAX (m) GMMIN (m)
9.03 42511.5 15.034 1.045
10.75 50138.3 14.089 0.902
12.50 66453.2 13.501 0.771
14.22 78184.4 13.248 0.663
ables which can have a major impact on dynamic intact sta-
bility (US Navy criteria outputs in Table 10 and Table 11). 
However, they are accepted by the experts, and within con-
ventional hull forms, have proven to be a reliable, generally 
conservative, ordinal measure of intact stability.  Current in-
ternational efforts for improving naval ships stability criteria 
are focused on time domain analysis including the capability 
to model a steered ship.  Merchant ship intact stability is ad-
dressed in a number of IMO regulations. 
The IMO weather criteria considers wind with gusts and 
a roll-back angle which is dependent on the ship’s static 
righting arm and other ship roll characteristics.  The US Navy 
and other navies have not kept pace with IMO developments. 
They continue to rely on the empirical World War II criteria 
until the more sophisticated methods are developed and vali-
dated.  Validation and acceptance of these new methods may 
take some time.  Current naval ship can be greatly improved 
with a few small changes which maintain the integrity of their 
basic approach, and increase their commonality with the IMO 
criteria.  These changes are worth making now, to support the 
design of new ships until more sophisticated methods are in 
place.  The worst damage is that which includes three com-
partments. 
5. New Approach
The damage categories, in the NSC, are based on defined
shapes: 
 Sphere.  To be used for explosions.  For explosions deto-
nating against the outside of the hull, half the sphere to be
used.
 Cube.  To be used to define the volume directly affected by
fire and which may change in shape to fit the compartment.
 Raking/grounding.  To be used in the appropriate horizontal
orientation to describe the extent of raking or grounding
Table 12.  Worst damage along with NSC for first project. 
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION 
Draft (m) Displacement (T) KGMAX (m) GMMIN (m)
3.65 4069.5 15.034 1.045
4.43 4801.9 14.089 0.902
5.37 6364.5 13.501 0.771
6.21 7488.1 13.248 0.663
Table 13.  Worst damage along with NSC for second project. 
MAXIMUM KG AND MINIMUM GM CALCULATION 
Draft (m) Displacement (T) KGMAX (m) GMMIN (m)
  9.03 42511.5 13.966 1.756 
10.75 50138.3 13.338 1.444
12.50 66453.2 12.782 1.212
14.22 78184.4 12.342 0.996 
damage, the apex representing the maximum penetration. 
 Collision.  To be used in the correct vertical orientation to
describe the extent of collision damage from the bow of
another ship, the apex representing the maximum penetra-
tion.
The extent of the worst damage category is defined as 
damage category C, significant: sphere with 10 (m) of radius, 
cube with 20 (m) of sides, raking/grounding with 40 (m) of 
length and 5 (m) of equal sides and collision damage with 40 
(m) of height and 5 (m) of equal sides.  The temperature is heat 
caused by initiating event assuming no other combustion. 
Time to rise to peak of 20 (min), peak temperature 400 (C), 
duration of peak temperature 400 (min) and time for tem-
perature to revert to normal 200 (min). 
After the study of the outputs, it is possible to declare that 
the worst damage is the grounding, as it is shown in Tables 12 
and 13.  Proof that ships meets all known criteria, will not 
tolerate a failure of forty meters in length in the double bottom. 
Therefore, for comparison between criteria, it will not be used 
the failure of raking/grounding, defined in the NSC.  Of the 
other three types of damage, and if comparable with the 
SOLAS, the worst of all is the one defined by a cube of twenty 
meters on the side.  Such as the title of the work submitted for 
this article it is important to note that a detailed study of the 
navies criteria to use for the calculations, made by a CAD, the 
criterion of NES-109.  It is necessary in this case study the 
damage defined as the NSC with a cube. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a comparative analysis of 
the different criteria of stability after damage.  For this re-
search the various studies and calculations have been carried 
out on a designed test vessel.  We have created a vessel to 
comply with different conditions, like having an empty deck, 
Fig. 5.  Second project studied in a 3D visualization. 
without pillars, one propeller shaft and whose forms are as 
close as possible to a warship.  See Fig. 5. 
A most important conclusion to emphasize, that while the 
approach of the British Royal Navy is more restrictive than the 
US Navy, if we are considering the Stockholm Agreement to 
SOLAS, is that this convention is the most restrictive of all.  If 
water is seen on deck, no military approach is more restrictive 
than the IMO.  It means that the navies never have considered 
in their calculations water on deck.  It is true that due to civil 
ro-ro accidents, during the nineties, the IMO started consid-
ering the water on deck as dangerous and it was incorporated 
an annex to the SOLAS, to take account this problem.  Al-
though the navies never have considered this kind of flood, it 
seems that this problem has a critical value in the ship damage 
stability analysis.  In concrete, this damage should be inves-
tigated, if the ship has a low freeboard. 
There are many areas where military vessels could improve 
safety standards, although not necessarily to be regarded as 
less secure than the civil vessels.  However, there are major 
difficulties in implementing all the rules of the Classification 
Societies in the naval field; especially to establish a priority 
mission and capacity combat against security.  It is important 
to distinguish the importance of the new rules NSC.  The NSC 
has become the criterion of stability in damage than more is 
acclimating to the navies’ standards in the XXI century, as it 
has been reflected throughout the paper.  For each type of 
vessel could be a priority for study in terms of damages of the 
NSC.  As the NSC is to provide a level of safety appropriate to 
the role of the ship and benchmarked against statute while 
taking into account naval operations, it is necessary to define 
the degree of survivability in a form that can be taken into 
account in the development and application of all NSC chap-
ters.  By way of example, the fundamental difference between 
the approach to fire safety for naval and civilian shipping is 
that SOLAS considers the risk of fire based on the function of 
each compartment whereas for naval ships, hostile acts may 
result in fire anywhere on the ship, both externally and inter-
nally.  The consequence is that the solutions that are adopted 
for accidents may differ from those that are required to prevent 
and counteract hostile damage events.  Thus, for the effective 
application of the NSC, it is necessary to clearly define the 
extent of damage that reflects both accidental damage and 
potential damage caused by hostile acts, the damage location, 
the degree of vulnerability (protection, redundancy of systems, 
materials used), the required post-damage ship capability and 
the philosophy for recovery from the damaged state.  Each 
navy will have its own unique approach to this issue, and it is 
not possible to be prescriptive in the NSC.  However, it is 
possible to provide a basic framework that can then be adapted 
by each Naval Administration.  It is then essential that the 
owner and naval administration agree the required level of 
survivability in these terms for each class of ship. 
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